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InTroducTIon
The General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) as amended by the Uruguay Round Amendments, which created the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), contains 
rules on Border Tax Adjustments (“BTAs”).1 No single section 
of this agreement deals exclusively with BTAs; however, rules 
addressing BTAs can be found throughout, namely in Articles 
II, III, and XVI.2
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (“OECD”) Working Party, BTAs are “any 
fiscal measures that put into effect the destination principle in 
whole or in part.”3 In other words, BTAs relieve exported prod-
ucts of some or all of the tax the exporting country charged on 
similar domestic products in the home market and enables the 
importing country to charge some or all of the tax on imported 
products that it charges on similar domestic products. The term 
“border tax adjustment” is somewhat confusing because it sug-
gests that a fiscal measure is applied at the border, which is not 
always the case.4 Although in many cases imports are taxed on 
entry, certain countries apply a tax to imports after the goods 
have crossed the border and have been sold to other merchants or 
consumers. Moreover, the OCED has noted that certain tax sys-
tems do not tax exports at all and make no adjustment at the bor-
der.5 Considering these varying tax systems, the OECD Working 
Party has recommended the replacement of the term “border tax 
adjustments” with “tax adjustments applied to goods entering 
into international trade.”6
The OECD’s careful treatment of BTAs illustrates that they 
are not a novel concept to international trade. However, BTAs 
have only recently been considered as an innovative policy 
option for addressing the challenges of climate change. The con-
cept of climate change BTAs is as follows: carbon-taxing coun-
tries would levy import fees on goods that non-carbon-taxing 
countries manufacture. The motivating factor for these measures 
is—at least in theory—to internalize the real costs of producing 
goods and services with respect to international climate change 
regulation, thereby leveling the playing field between producers 
of like products from different countries.7
A BTA would tax imported goods the equivalent of what the 
producers would have had to pay to produce them in the home 
market they are entering. Under this system, domestic produc-
ers in countries with carbon taxes will not face costly climate 
change measures that foreign producers do not face in their 
home countries. An alternative approach would be to impose 
taxes on imported goods that are equivalent to the enforcement 
of emissions allowance trading.8 Therefore, in order to import 
products from a nation that does not comply with the carbon 
taxes applied in the importing country, an importer of goods 
would be required to purchase emission rights in his home coun-
try, compensating for the difference.9
Some commentators have mentioned that these measures 
should be called Border Carbon Adjustment (“BCA”), because 
“requirements to buy into domestic cap-and-trade schemes are 
more like regulations than taxes.”10 However, while recognizing 
BCA as a more precise concept, considering BTAs have usually 
been proposed to address climate change in the form of taxes, we 
will continue using the term BTA. This article will first provide a 
background on climate change and multilateral efforts to resolve 
the problem. It will then move on to a discussion of the potential 
treatment of BTAs under WTO law. Finally, we will discuss the 
implications of this analysis in Latin America with a focus on 
Chile.
cLImaTe change background  
and muLTILaTeraL eFForTs
Climate change is a widely recognized, global problem 
caused by humans, and the time for action is now; current trends 
indicate that we will likely arrive at a point of no return between 
2015 and 2020.11 Commentators note that the cost of taking 
measures now is much less expensive than waiting until 2020 or 
2030.12 Climate change is regulated by a multilateral treaty and 
protocol in the context of the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).13 Even if measures 
to address climate change are both multilateral and domestic, the 
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perspective from Latin America, and especially from Chile, is 
that environmental issues and global problems should be treated 
multilaterally.14
The official position of the Government of Chile’s foreign 
policy, unchanged in recent decades, is “to contribute to the 
strengthening of multilateralism.”15 In this sense, Chile aims to 
strengthen the climate regime in the United Nations. The Chilean 
government officially promotes the joint action of nations on the 
global agenda in areas such as security threats, natural resources, 
energy, environment, sustainable development, climate change, 
international violations, poverty, and governance.16
In the context of multilateral solutions, Border Tax Adjust-
ments seem to be a unilateral answer to the problem of climate 
change. BTAs can be politically feasible for the adoption of 
national regulations in countries like the United States, but they 
are seen as a threat to the international trading system and could 
potentially violate international trade law under the WTO.
Resolving this potential conflict between climate change 
mitigation measures and international trade law is of paramount 
importance. Since the early nineties, multilateral environmental 
agreements, soft law instruments, and the OECD have encour-
aged the use of a broad range of instruments, and especially 
the use of market-based instruments, to reduce environmental 
impacts.17 States are increasingly employing economic instru-
ments, such as taxes and charges, as instruments of environmen-
tal policy-making to address inputs and production processes.18
Even though no Border Tax Adjustments have been imple-
mented yet, the United States and the European Union have 
considered the possibility of imposing BTAs ever since the Cli-
mate Conference held in Copenhagen on December 2009 failed 
to produce a global deal to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions.19
european union
BTAs have been a subject of debate in the European Union 
since 2006 when the EU’s High Level Group (“HLG”) on Com-
petitiveness, Energy, and Environment advised the European 
Commission to analyze the viability of all potential policy mea-
sures, including border tax adjustments, that could encourage 
EU trading partners to decrease GHG emissions, so as to reduce 
climate change risks and the impact of a carbon premium on 
European competitiveness.20 However, consensus to implement 
BTAs has not been reached and European heads of state remain 
divided on the subject. In December 2006, EU Trade Commis-
sioner Peter Mandelson pointed out that:
[A] specific “climate” tariff on countries that have 
not ratified Kyoto . . . would be highly problematic 
under current [WTO] rules, and almost impossible to 
implement in practice. [D]eveloping countries are not 
required to make specific emissions cuts under the 
Kyoto Protocol; also . . . some U.S. states have ambi-
tious climate policies. 21
John Hontelez, Secretary General of the European Environ-
mental Bureau22 affirmed that:
[BTAs] might be the answer which allows the EU to 
develop responsible climate policies without having 
to wait for other countries. They would result in prod-
ucts imported from the US being taxed to compensate 
for resulting differences in production costs. Thus EU 
firms would be protected against unfair, carbon-care-
less competition from outside.23
In 2006, then French Prime Minister Dominique de Ville-
pin suggested that countries that do not join a post-2012 interna-
tional treaty on climate change should face extra tariffs on their 
industrial exports.24 De Villepin argued that “[c]ountries like the 
U.S. and China . . . should not be allowed to benefit from efforts 
to reduce climate change without having to shoulder some of the 
costs or suffer from any related loss in competitiveness.”25 Sub-
sequent reports of the HLG do not reach the subject of Border 
Tax Adjustments and instead called for other measures as inter-
national action on climate change.26
uniteD StateS
The relationship between the U.S. and the international cli-
mate change regime has been controversial. As the Byrd-Hagel 
Resolution of 1997 asserts, the United States should not sign or 
agree to any convention or protocol on any subject matter con-
taining new commitments to limit or reduce GHGs unless it also 
mandates developing countries to do the same, or that “would 
result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.”27 
It has been reported that some sectors of U.S. “industry have 
lobbied hard for climate legislation to include border measures, 
citing competitiveness concerns, the need to encourage large 
developing country emitters to adopt binding emissions targets, 
and fears of ‘carbon leakage’”—the relocation of firms to coun-
tries with fewer carbon restrictions, increasing global emissions 
or leaving them unaffected.28
In this context, in June 2008 the Lieberman-Warner Cli-
mate Security Act29 was introduced in the U.S. Congress with 
the intention of establishing measures to reduce GHGs, includ-
ing a cap-and-trade program and a measure requiring certain 
importers to submit special allowances.30 Rather than impose a 
Border Tax Adjustment, this bill would have required importers 
of GHG-intensive products from other countries without com-
parable GHG reduction schemes to buy international credits or 
other emission certificates from the federal government or from 
a U.S. regulatory program.31
The same year, another bill, The Climate Market Auction 
Trust and Trade Emissions Reduction System Act of 2008 (“Cli-
mate Matters Act of 2008”), included measures to reduce GHGs 
emissions, including offering developing WTO participant coun-
tries “access to the carbon market . . . includ[ing] additional 
incentives such as the ability to choose the base year or maxi-
mum level of allowable greenhouse gas emissions for its emis-
sions trading system, rather than requiring it to match the [U.S.] 
system.”32 This measure targeted the large emerging economies 
and gave exceptions to: “least developed countries” and “coun-
tries that generate less than [five percent] of global emissions.”33 
Moreover, the income of the BTA “would be used to offset the 
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negative effects of climate change in developing countries (e.g., 
through technology transfer).”34
On June 26, 2009, the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009 (“ACES”) was approved by the House of Represen-
tatives by a narrow 219-212 margin.35 Although the bill never 
passed the Senate, it aimed to reduce emissions with a gradu-
ated schedule through 2050 by calling for extra import charges 
on goods from countries that do not cap greenhouse gas emis-
sions.36 President Barack Obama considers ACES’s border tax 
adjustments clauses to be tariffs penalizing goods from coun-
tries that are not actively limiting GHG emissions, and criticism 
has arisen due to concerns of protectionism and because the bill 
appears to make tariff penalties the rule.37 Obama recognized 
a legitimate concern that American businesses not be disadvan-
taged by higher energy costs, but emphasized that various forms 
of transitional assistance for energy-intensive industries already 
existed without the need for “a tariff approach.”38
All U.S. legislative proposals have two common features: 
they exempt goods from border tax adjustments if imported 
from countries with minimum GHG emissions, and apply BTAs 
to “primary products” with high GHG emission levels during 
their production process, such as: iron, steel, aluminum, cement, 
glass, paper and pulp, chemicals, and industrial ceramics.39 
ACES also covers any “manufactured item for consumption” 
that generates “a substantial quantity of greenhouse gas emis-
sions.”40 These policies specifically target developing countries 
like China, Brazil, and India that are considered large emitters 
of GHGs because most developed countries already have emis-
sions reduction plans and exports from smaller countries would 
be excluded by the legislation as they emit less than 0.5% of 
global emissions.41 Nevertheless, because of their drafting, these 
measures could easily affect other developing countries if they 
increase their GHG emissions, even if overall they contribute 
minimally in the context of global emissions, as we will explain 
later.
border Tax adjusTmenTs and The WTo
As we will see, economists and lawyers in the field of both 
international trade and environmental law have discussed the 
legality of BTA measures under WTO law. However, up to now 
neither BTAs nor climate change policies have been challenged 
under the WTO dispute settlement system. Commentators have 
opined that a case regarding a BTA before the WTO would be 
difficult and controversial for lack of precedent at the WTO and 
before the international climate regime.42 Indeed, even the Kyoto 
Protocol provides in Article 2.3 that parties included in Annex I 
“shall strive to implement policies and measures under this Arti-
cle in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the 
adverse effects of climate change, effects on international trade, 
and social, environmental, and economic impacts on other Par-
ties, especially developing country Parties.”43
Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol list various poli-
cies and measures by which industrialized countries can achieve 
emission limitations, including tax and duty exemptions and 
subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors.44 Nevertheless, 
the protocol lacks specificity because it does not offer concrete 
steps or targets to achieve those policies and measures. Due to 
this lack of specificity, it is difficult to claim jurisdiction over 
such behavior and to authorize a body or mechanism to address 
it. As a consequence, policies and measures are not included in 
the UN climate regime’s compliance system and dispute settle-
ment procedure.45
It is not clear that the Kyoto Protocol’s permissive rules 
on policies and measures are in conflict with WTO law, either 
directly or indirectly, and some commentators believe that 
properly designed BTAs could meet WTO rules, yet others dis-
agree.46 Discussions revolve around the legality of BTAs under 
the international trade system, the relation between BTAs and 
subsidies, the difficulty of assessing or calculating BTAs, and 
the justification of such measures under climate change regime.
bTas are PermIssIbLe under WTo LaW
BTAs are explicitly allowed by the GATT as long as the 
tax imposed on imported goods is no greater than the tax estab-
lished for similar domestic products.47 It has been noted that 
“the GATT does not impose any requirement that nations adopt 
a tax base that can be administered without double taxation, in 
fact or in principle. For example, countries can impose a BTA on 
imports without any corresponding rebate for exports.”48
However, it is still uncertain whether BTAs can be used 
for taxable inputs that are not physically incorporated 
into the final traded product. For instance, it is not clear 
if an import tax could vary based on the amount of car-
bon dioxide emitted during a good’s production—WTO 
rules would have to be interpreted in a way that consid-
ers products not to be “like” each other based on their 
carbon footprints.49
The latter would be true only if this factor could be consid-
ered a “relevant comparator.”50 To do so would require advanc-
ing the argument that any product which emits one ton of carbon 
is a “like product” akin to any other product which emits one ton 
of carbon. 51
Some commentators assert that BTAs “raise the costs of 
imported products based on the amount of greenhouse gases 
emitted occurring abroad during the manufacturing of each prod-
uct. In international trade, this type of regulation is a process and 
production method (“PPM”) measure and cannot be used to dis-
tinguish between like products.”52 Therefore, the argument goes, 
“BTAs on environmental taxes embodied in pollution-intensive 
traded goods are or should be barred when the tax is on emis-
sions or a polluting input rather than the good itself.”53
The non-adopted report of the GATT Tuna-Dolphin Panel 
was the origin of the process/product distinction:
under the national treatment principle of Article III, 
contracting parties may apply border tax adjustments 
with regard to those taxes that are borne by products, 
but not for domestic taxes not directly levied on prod-
ucts (such as income taxes). . . . The Panel considered 
that it would be inconsistent to limit the application 
of this Note to taxes that are born by products while 
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permitting its application to regulations not applied to 
the product as such.54
However, like the Tuna-Dolphin decision itself, neither the 
GATT contracting parties nor the WTO have ever adopted the 
process/product approach. Several scholars “have observed that 
the process/product distinction itself was rooted in a misunder-
standing by the panel of the GATT rules governing BTAs.”55 
Moreover, from a historical point of view, “it was the intent of 
the original GATT negotiators that process as well as product 
charges be border adjustable.”56
In addition, further GATT and WTO Dispute Settlement 
decisions have moved away from the process/product approach 
and have since considered other methods for determining what 
“like product” is. Some of those consider the motivation for a 
government’s product categorization in determining its legiti-
macy, including the Japan Alcohol Panel Report (1987),57 the 
U.S. Alcohol case,58 and the U.S. Taxes on Automobiles Report.59 
This approach is potentially much more sensitive to environmen-
tal policy goals like climate change. We must also keep in mind 
that according to Article III, Section V of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), 
“measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral 
ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”60
Even if a BTA were permitted and properly assessed, it 
would still need to overcome other legal trade hurdles. Once 
found to be covered by GATT Article III, the BTA must also 
meet the substantive test in that provision, which requires that 
imported products not be treated less favorably than like domes-
tic products (“national treatment”).61 In addition, the BTA must 
avoid discrimination between imports from different countries, 
as required by the “most-favored nation” obligation of GATT 
Article I.62 For some authors, a unilaterally imposed BTA 
on imported goods would most likely go against WTO rules, 
whereas using national treatment and most-favored nation prin-
ciples63 prevents different treatment of foreign products vis-à-
vis domestic like products.64
Furthermore, there is uncertainty as to what would happen 
with a cap-and-trade system and whether “the obligation to hold 
emission credits or allowances up to one’s actual level of carbon 
emissions be qualified as an ‘internal tax or other internal charge 
of any kind’ which, under GATT Article III:2, can be imposed 
also on imports.”65
noT ImPosIng bTas Is equIVaLenT To a subsIdy
One of the most famous scholars to advocate BTAs is 
Joseph Stiglitz who affirmed that “[n]ot paying the cost of dam-
age to the environment is a subsidy, just as not paying the full 
costs of workers would be.”66 According to Stiglitz, “in most of 
the developed countries of the world today, corporations are pay-
ing the cost of polluting the global environment, in the form of 
taxes imposed on coal, oil, and gas.”67 However, American firms 
are being massively subsidized because of the relative lack of 
this taxation in the U.S. He proposes a remedy:
[O]ther countries should prohibit the importation of 
American goods produced using energy intensive 
technologies, or, at the very least, impose a high tax 
on them, to offset the subsidy that those goods cur-
rently are receiving . . . [T]he United States itself has 
recognized this principle. It prohibited the importation 
of Thai shrimp that caused unnecessary deaths of large 
numbers of endangered species . . . [and] the WTO sus-
tained the important principle that global environmen-
tal concerns trump narrow commercial interests . . . . 
[I]f one can justify restricting importation of shrimp . 
. . to protect turtles, certainly one can justify restrict-
ing importation of goods produced by technologies that 
unnecessarily pollute our atmosphere.68
The EU also considers not applying BTAs as a potential ille-
gal subsidy that causes two major problems:
The first is the competitiveness of energy-intensive 
industries in the EU vis-à-vis competing industries in 
jurisdictions without similar environmental restric-
tions. Normally, a foreign producer that operates at 
lower costs is simply more competitive and should . . 
. be able to out-compete its domestic rival. But when 
lower costs result from the lack of environmental costs, 
the advantage is artificial . . . . The second potential 
problem is “carbon leakage,” which means that any 
domestic carbon reduction would be offset in the global 
environmental commons by an increase in carbon emis-
sions elsewhere.69
But what happens if we apply this solution to developing 
countries? Should we not consider the principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility? This principle is one of the cor-
nerstones of sustainable development, emerging in the context 
of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and underpinning the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol.70 However for developing countries,71 
Stiglitz suggests something different: a common (global) envi-
ronmental tax on emissions that addresses their social cost.72
But, should we consider the absence of emission cuts a sub-
sidy or a carbon tax? It is clearly not a subsidy in a traditional 
sense, but as some commentators have pointed out:
The problem is not that the Chinese government is 
paying Chinese producers or is otherwise transferring 
funds; rather, the problem is that the government fails 
to act, that is, it fails to impose and collect a carbon tax 
or to otherwise force Chinese producers to internalize 
the full cost of carbon emitted in China.73
Thus, even if not imposing a carbon tax or not requiring 
producers to internalize the cost of carbon could be qualified as 
a “subsidy” under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures, countervailing duties to offset subsidies by 
foreign governments can only be levied in the case of a particu-
lar subsidy74 to “an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises 
or industries.”75
A further question arises if “carbon credits” would be con-
sidered a subsidy if they are distributed for free. What would 
happen if, using the cap-and-trade system, domestic producers 
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who face competition from competitors who manufacture in 
countries without GHG laws were given free credits? This pro-
posal would most likely provide a subsidy to the industry in 
comparison to other domestic industries and could potentially 
violate trade law, but this conclusion is arguable.
bTas are dIFFIcuLT To assess or caLcuLaTe
We have seen that BTAs could be used to “level the playing 
field between taxed domestic manufacturers and untaxed foreign 
competitors.”76 Under GATT Articles II and III, WTO members 
may impose “internal charges” on imported goods.77 Neverthe-
less, while internal charges can be relatively easy to identify, “it 
is difficult to assess the quantity of carbon emissions resulting 
from the production of a particular good. Could carbon taxes or 
higher energy costs linked to a cap-and-trade system qualify for 
a similar adjustment?”78
Another key question is whether it is even possible to estab-
lish a trade appropriate BTA. A true BTA would tax the actual 
GHG emissions resulting from manufacture, which seems nearly 
impossible to quantify. Moreover, it is not yet clear whether a 
BTA could be administered in a way that is truly free trade neu-
tral, or if due to its administrative difficulty it would inevitably 
be a trade barrier.
Proposed BTAs are generally based on the average addi-
tional cost of the GHG law and raise the following pertinent 
question under WTO law: if a general tax on carbon emissions 
is imposed based on the local corporation’s actual carbon emis-
sions (so a low emissions factory pays less), and an international 
company with the same low emissions pays the industry average, 
would this be legal under WTO rules?
bTas can be jusTIFIed To PreVenT cLImaTe change
Even if BTAs conflict with international trade law, they 
might still be legal if justifiable under GATT Article XX,79 
which specifies the conditions under which State Members can 
be exempted from WTO general rules. Two of these enumerated 
exemptions could be relevant in the case of BTAs: if doing so is 
necessary “to protect human, animal, or plant life or health,”80 or 
“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”81 
In addition, we must keep in mind that the introductory para-
graph (“Chapeau”) of Article XX allows such measures as long 
as they “are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade.”82 Such an exemption would most likely 
“center on whether, under the introductory phrase of GATT 
Article XX, a [BTA] . . . is applied on a variable scale that takes 
account of local conditions in foreign countries, including their 
own efforts to fight global warming and the level of economic 
development in developing countries.”83 Therefore, a govern-
ment “would also have to show that the measure is being applied 
squarely to avoid ‘leakage,’ rather than to offset competitive con-
cerns.”84 Additionally, to qualify as an exception under Article 
XX, the BTA would also have to be the least trade restrictive 
measure.85
A recent article also claims that BTAs “will only survive 
a WTO challenge if they successfully invoke one of the GATT 
Article XX environmental exceptions,” which would be difficult 
because BTAs are designed with the principle intent of main-
taining economic competitiveness.86 In contrast, if a BTA based 
on a domestic carbon tax neither discriminates against imports 
as compared to domestic products nor as compared to other 
imported goods, it might be permissible without resorting to the 
exemptions embodied in GATT Article XX.87
border Tax adjusTmenTs and deVeLoPIng 
counTrIes: LaTIn amerIca’s case
Some “targeted” countries of future BTAs have expressed 
their opposition to these measures, most notably China88 and 
India.89 However, for the most part, Latin America has not pre-
sented either support or opposition for BTAs. In analyzing why 
this may be the case, it is first important to examine the contribu-
tion of Latin American countries to global GHG production and 
the exports from Latin America on which BTAs could be applied 
in the future. Chile is presented as a case study.
In 2004, Chilean emissions were only 0.2% of total global 
emissions.90 However, while the annual per capita emission level 
of 3.9 tons of CO2 per inhabitant is very modest compared to 
developed nations, Chile is second in total GHG emissions in 
South America only to Venezuela,91 and has emissions similar 
to Portugal when it undertook its Kyoto reduction obligations.92
Furthermore, the economy of Chile is becoming more and 
more dependent on coal. University of Chile studies show that 
by 2030 electric generation in Chile will be sixty percent depen-
dent on coal. That means that CO2 emissions may grow from 
14.2 to 85 million tons of CO2 between 2006 and 2030 and that 
emission per capita may grow from 3.6 tons of CO2 in 2005 to 
13.8 tons by 2030, more than China and OECD countries.93 On 
March 1, 2011, the Central Castilla coal-fired power plant of the 
Atacama region,94 the largest coal-fired power plant in South 
America, was approved by the Chilean impact assessment sys-
tem (“SEIA”). The day after, SEIA approved a project aimed at 
extracting coal to be sold to coal-power plants. These develop-
ments have generated public concern and controversy.95
Directly related to BTAs is the question of the carbon foot-
print of exported products. This was conceptualized as a way to 
internalize climate costs generated by the production and trans-
portation of products. Studies have shown that Kyoto Protocol 
Annex I countries are net importers of carbon and that develop-
ing countries are carbon exporters.96
Chile has begun to measure the carbon footprint of its main 
products, particularly exported ones. But in the end, the ques-
tion is how deep the carbon footprint of each of those products 
and sectors is, and ultimately: are the countries, which receive 
Chilean exports, going to adopt a BTA that affects Chilean 
products? Copper mining, which accounts for the largest por-
tion of exports, is energy intensive. Chile has become an OECD 
member,97 and the OECD recommended that Chile increase its 
application of the polluter pays principle (“PPP”) in the Chil-
ean economy.98 The WTO recommends implementing this PPP 
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through measures such as a carbon tax and tradable permits. 
International trade rules require Chile to assume the cost of 
the “carbonization” of its economy or to accept the cost of lost 
competitiveness.99
concLusIon
At first glance, BTAs appear to have the potential to reduce 
global GHG emissions, but there are some important caveats to 
consider: a) BTAs are unilateral in a world of multilateral climate 
change regimes;100 b) BTAs could be used against developing 
countries, reversing the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility; c) the permissibility of BTAs under the GATT 
depends on the legal interpretation of the relevant international 
treaties, colored by political and administrative concerns; d) 
BTAs most likely would not fit under WTO law, because it is 
unlikely that they would be the least trade restrictive measure; 
and e) if BTAs are feasible they will most likely be difficult to 
administer or enforce.
Independent from considerations of protectionism and 
transparency, BTAs could be a threat to Latin America through 
the pressure from foreign markets, in this case pushing towards 
a low carbon economy. Other such pressure is embodied in the 
October 2009 Loi Grenelle 2 in France, which states that after 
January 2011, food imports will be regulated for carbon foot-
prints, and that for French exports GHG emissions must be 
reported and included in labeling.101
If a carbon BTA could be perfectly designed and admin-
istered, theoretically there would be no effect on the share of 
exports to the country imposing the BTA. It would still be almost 
equally as profitable to export to that country, and would just 
be more expensive to buy the goods within the country (from 
either domestic or international suppliers). Some demand would 
shift from the carbon heavy items to cheaper, carbon-light items, 
but an ideal BTA should not have a large effect on the export 
economy of the developing country. A perfectly designed system 
could have neutral pressure on the economy of Chile and other 
countries. However, the issue is whether or not such an ideal 
BTA could be unilaterally imposed.
For a BTA to be effective, accurate calculation of carbon 
footprints would be necessary. Moreover, considering the PPP 
and the Common but Differentiated Responsibility principle, 
the main question relates to who must pay the costs of carbon 
produced by production and transportation: the consumer or 
producer? In a competitive world economy, if the price of an 
input is raised uniformly, the end product must rise or else the 
producing firms would find a better use for their capital and stop 
making the product. It seems that making a producer pay for the 
carbon directly is an administratively easier way to differenti-
ate between production methods. These pressures, expressed by 
unilateral measures that should be avoided to address ecologi-
cal problems, could mean that mitigation obligations might pass 
from developed to developing countries, reversing the Common 
but Differentiated Responsibilities principle.
Noting the passing of mitigation obligations in the unilat-
eral application of BTAs, former Chilean President Lagos, Spe-
cial UN Commissioner for Climate Change, proposed that, in 
addition to Chile’s conformity with unilateral requirements for 
exporting to the United States or France, exporters to develop-
ing countries should equally consider the transportation costs of 
their goods, and the transportation of those goods.102
However, from an environmental perspective, Chile should 
support BTAs because without them some high carbon indus-
tries might relocate to Chile, increasing the carbon footprint 
per capita disproportionately faster than would otherwise occur 
without carbon taxes in the developed countries. In early 2011, 
the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, Christiana Figueres, 
warned the Americas have become “fossilized,” rather than using 
renewable energy, and mentioned that Chile has already reached 
levels of emissions of gases typical of European countries.103 
Where does the responsibility for the increased carbon footprint 
in Chile lie? Should it be considered the responsibility of Chile, 
or that of the countries that induced industries to relocate unnec-
essarily? As this problem demonstrates, any truly sustainable 
application of BTAs will require a multilateral approach, taking 
into consideration the complex interactions between the many 
participants in the global trading system.
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